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Article 9

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONS, CULTURE, AND HISTORY
MICHAL JAN ROZBICKI*
Governments, like clocks, go from motion the men give them; and as
1
governments are made and moved by men, so by them they are ruined too.

The relationship between constitutional law and social reality remains a
fairly grey area of knowledge, mainly because studying it requires efforts that
move well beyond the separated methods employed internally by law, political
science, anthropology, history, sociology, communication, and other academic
disciplines that, collectively, might shine new light on it. At the same time, a
deeper understanding of this field is vital to scholarship on international and
comparative law, as well as to legal history, because of the need to understand
how cultural context supplies meaning to legal texts. Two papers presented at
the “Invisible Constitutions: Culture, Religion and Liberty” symposium at the
Saint Louis University School of Law, “The Relevance of African Culture in
Building Modern Institutions and the Quest for Legal Pluralism” by Semahagn
Abebe,2 and “Bringing Comparison Home: A Components Approach to
Culture in Comparative Law” by Monica Eppinger,3 offer important and useful
theoretical reflections about the nature of this relationship.
Abebe’s specific question is what to do with the seeming incompatibility
between what he calls informal and formal institutional systems of social
organization and governance in Africa, but his larger query is essentially about
the conditions for a successful marriage between modern constitutionalism and
existing, historically established cultures.4 An accurate answer would be of
serious significance not only for the future political development of African
states, but also for the continuing debates about the nature of globalization,

* Professor, Department of History, and Director of the Center for Intercultural Studies at Saint
Louis University.
1. William Penn, Charter of Liberties and Frame of Government of the Province of
Pennsylvania (May 5, 1682), reprinted in COLONIAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 274 (Donald S. Lutz ed., 1998).
2. Semahagn Abebe, The Relevance of African Culture in Building Modern Institutions and
the Quest for Legal Pluralism, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429 (2013).
3. Monica Eppinger, Sages, Savages and Other Speech Act Communities: Culture in
Comparative Law, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 407 (2013).
4. Abebe, supra note 2, at 430–31.
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most recently reignited by the popular liberation movements in the Middle
East.
To begin reflecting on the prospects of such an answer, it is useful to
consider the phrase “transition to democracy.” It has been gushingly used in
Western media over the past three decades whenever an authoritarian regime
had collapsed.5 Whether such events took place in Russia and Eastern Europe,
Tunisia, Libya, or Egypt, the premise behind this cliché is a manifestly
deterministic notion that a universalized, modern, Western-style democracy
must be the preordained trajectory of development for all these countries. But
democracy is not a cosmic axiom. It is not something that already exists out
there and only needs to be unwrapped and put into action by removing
obstacles to its flourishing. It is a historically developed, man-made product.
For example, modern American democracy was not created deus ex machina
in 1776; it took over two centuries of halting, often painful, experiences to
become an egalitarian and inclusive system.6 Those who today fetishize the
Constitution’s presumably modern and democratic “original intent” as timeless
neglect the fact that not only the Constitution but also the original intent had a
history, and when viewed in the context of that history this intent was not to
include all people under the umbrella of rights and liberties. Such inclusion
took place only when gradual culture change—stretching over two centuries—
made full equality conceivable and actionable.
If democracy in formerly non-democratic countries is to succeed, its
advocates need to draw conclusions from its historicism. Cultural space to
accommodate it must first be created if its constitutional codifications are to be
successfully implemented in real life. That is a slow and complex process,
because a powerful obstacle stands in the way—the very nature of cultures.
Cultures are products of long, collective experiences of a people. Cultures
make sense of people’s lives, and provide stability and order in the chaos of
existence. They consist largely of self-evident, taken-for-granted assumptions,
which would explain why they tend to spontaneously resist changes to such
assumptions. In fact, they may even be viewed as mechanisms for surviving
change, and they best serve this purpose when they are reliably stable. This is
why incompatibilities between different cultures with distinct histories behind

5. See, e.g., Shadi Hamid, A Crisis of Legitimacy, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 20, 2011, 11:41 AM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/07/is-egypt-losing-its-regional-power/howlong-is-egypts-transition-to-democracy; Seth Mydans, Burmese General Says Transition to
Democracy Will Be Slow, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, at 7; Nepal Picks New Prime Minister, in
Transition to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1991, at A9.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I (establishing freedom of speech, religion, and assembly), U.S.
CONST. amend. VI (establishing the rights of the accused in a criminal trial), U.S. CONST. amend.
XIII (abolishing slavery), U.S. CONST. amend XIX (giving women the right to vote).
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them are not anomalies—as the widely used concept of ethnocentrism might
imply—but are inherent to the very ontology of cultures.
Yet, cultures are constantly faced with change—brought about by
migrations, wars, trade, colonization, economic developments, or
transformations of ecological environment. It is therefore convenient to
conceptualize them in terms of perennial tensions between the tendency to
preserve their structures and the necessity of adapting to new situations. The
resulting adjustment is a product of the contest between these two forces, and it
is not cost-free, something that may not be immediately apparent to postmodern, Western societies, where freely choosing an exotic cuisine, a dress
style, or even a church seems natural and self-evident. Adopting new ways
usually involves the demise—every so often painful—of old ways.
Democracy and democratic constitutions, like other cultural products, are
results of peculiar configurations of collective experiences over long periods of
time. Such products are stored in cultures’ resource banks as capital. The
informal systems of governance in Africa that Abebe is referring to are rooted
in cultural patterns preceding the colonial era—in the role of the elders and
their mediating functions, local organization of society, community consensusbuilding, traditional justice, ethnic values, and religious beliefs.7 By contrast,
the formal systems, instituted during the post-decolonization period, are
usually Western-modeled, liberal constitutions, with elections, separation of
powers, and parliamentary, administrative and judicial structures based on
European models.8 The latter systems were originally introduced as antitheses
of traditional, local ways, understood as impediments to modernization.9
Because these local ways were not taken into account when the liberal polities
were being introduced, anomalous configurations were created as the topdown, quasi-Westernization—without corresponding economic and social
modernization—generated tensions between imported (“visible”) innovations
and traditional (“invisible”) localism.10 The result was that patterns of
citizenship and social order became incoherent, opening the way to a variety of
authoritarian regimes clad in nominally liberal, Western constitutional

7. Abebe, supra note 2, at 436–41.
8. Id. at 433; C.I.A., Botswana, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publi
cations/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html (last updated Oct. 4, 2012); C.I.A., Namibia, THE
WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wa.html
(last updated Oct. 16, 2012); C.I.A., South Africa, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html (last updated Oct. 4, 2012); C.I.A., Zambia,
THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
za.html (last updated Oct. 4, 2012).
9. Abebe, supra note 2, at 430.
10. Id. at 433.
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structures.11 These post-colonial systems, as Abebe points out, resembled
neither traditionally African cultural ways nor modern democratic practices.
I believe that the most creative part of Abebe’s thesis is that it turns the old
argument in the debate over tradition versus modernity on its head. He rejects
the rejection of modern liberal values as alien and incompatible with local
traditions, and he rejects the rejection of traditional African practices as
inherently un-liberal.12 Instead, he points to certain ingredients in traditional
African ways—such as community councils and mediation of elders (both
based on reconciliation and consensus building rather than majority vote)—
that are indigenous, yet consistent in certain ways with broad liberal values.13
As such, they could potentially serve as stepping stones to designing
democratic political systems that are tailored to African cultures.14 In other
words, he shows that these traditional ways hold a huge advantage in that they
are already part of the existing cultural capital—a source of group identity and
a social glue to African societies—and so have the power of prior acceptance
and respect indispensable for any constitutional law to be effective. He has
thus articulated something that is intellectually very timely in this post-postcolonial stage of history. Democracy in Somaliland and Botswana does not
have to be the same as in Paris or London, but it should endeavor to promote
democratic values. At the same time, invocations of local, customary forms of
governance do not have to be mere cloaks for authoritarian regimes to hide
behind. Abebe has formulated a challenge for a new generation of African
legal and political leaders: devise new, pluralistic constitutions that fuse
modernity with traditional cultural practices in ways that can contribute to the
success of such hybrid models as democracies.15
Some of the newest scholarship on Western political and cultural history
provides evidence to bolster such thinking. There has recently been a growing
curiosity about traditional, popular, and local ways of participating in
governing before political involvement became wholly identified with
centralized states and modern constitutions.16 For instance, in the United
States, the two dominant historiographical schools, consensus and progressive,
still identify—wrongly, as I argue elsewhere—the American Revolution as a
radical shift from monarchic to egalitarian society; the former seeing the
founders as fully modern, and the latter denouncing them for betraying their

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 442.
Abebe, supra note 2, at 446.
See, e.g., MICHAL JAN ROZBICKI, CULTURE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 120–31 (Jan Ellen Lewis et al. eds., 2011); BARBARA CLARK SMITH,
THE FREEDOMS WE LOST 206 (2010).
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presumably modern ideals.17 But now some scholars are taking another look.
Barbara Clark Smith has shown not only that significant forms of participatory
liberty did exist before the Revolution, but that they offered more opportunities
for ordinary people than they would have after the establishment of the new
republic.18 What she claims is that people were not so much less free, as
differently free, and those earlier freedoms of colonial subjects involved
substantial popular participation in public affairs, practices that declined after
the Revolution.19 Common people regularly served on juries, joined crowds
that helped embrace or protest royal edicts, and ensured the laws were enforced
at community level at a time when no professional police forces existed.20
These traditions were actually widely utilized by the American Revolutionary
leaders to gain support for their cause, but once these leaders became the
governing political elite, they distanced themselves from many such traditions,
fearing that “mobocracy” would undermine their preeminence.21 Grassroots
participation soon became much more mediated and filtered, in keeping with
the Madisonian design.22
There is a certain analogy and a lesson here. Many authoritarian rulers in
Africa fear traditional, local institutions as rivals to centralized power, and yet
find themselves appealing to them by attacking Western liberal values, and by
assuming the mantle of spokesmen for traditional ways.23 They do so precisely
because these institutions hold tangible and significant cultural power—the
power to create an acceptable, ordered space where people feel at home. This
is why Abebe’s argument about harnessing this cultural authority in the service
of democracy makes so much sense.24
I have only one quibble with his line of argumentation. He brings up the
“universality of democratic values” as a point of reference, a premise that
seems to be at variance with his overall conclusions.25 It undermines the thrust
of his thesis, to liberate us from the old frameworks of thinking about
democratic constitutionalism as a one-size-fits-all, timeless arrangement with a
teleological trajectory. There may be parallels between democratic values in
different cultures, but there are no universals of liberty. No one is born with
democratic values any more than one is born with the idea of trial by jury or
the electric bulb. They all have a history. Someone had to invent them. This

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

ROZBICKI, supra note 166, at 120–31.
SMITH, supra note 16, at 206.
Id. at xi.
Id. at 18–46.
Id. at xiii–xiv.
Id. at 184, 207.
Abebe, supra note 2, at 446.
Id.
Id. at 435.
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historicity of cultures and constitutions is a fact that any related analysis needs
to appreciate.
In fact, it was the assumption of automatic universality of Western
democracy that had caused problems in the first place. One only need recall the
early UNESCO doctrine of “civilizing progress,” a concept unambiguously
based on universalized Western values, and aimed at unifying world societies
under its banner, rather than paying attention to the protection and preservation
of deeply rooted cultural identities among non-Western peoples.26 A number of
contemporary African decolonization leaders—such as Kwame Nkrumah in
Ghana and Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya—had studied at European universities and
tried to implement in their decolonizing countries constitutional models that
were products of Western historical experiences.27 Yet, old, pre-colonial
customs, deeply embedded in local cultures, endured because they continued to
make sense to people.28 This is why investing existing, local, cultural capital
into the production of modern, liberal, and political practices carries a promise
of success—it enables people to utilize culturally legitimated interpretative
tools they already possess to domesticate the new ways.
While Abebe deals with problems of integrating new political and legal
structures into existing cultural systems, Monica Eppinger’s essay looks at the
methodological and theoretical instruments for interpreting the relationship
between culture and law.29 She specifically considers the efficacy of using the
tools of linguistic anthropology to respond to the critical question of how
constitutions constitute; that is how language, including legal language, creates
reality for people.30 This is a very timely issue, for at least two reasons. First,
legal scholars rarely take this approach because they tend to focus on the legal
text’s presumed internal indicators of meaning. The proposed methods thus
carry a promise of freeing them from the traditional confines of originalism
and textualism. Second, disciplining these tools into a usable analytical
framework is a worthy goal because current usages of the term “culture” have
become too capacious and imprecise.
Her propositions derive from postmodern epistemologies that reject
structuralist, unifying belief in cultures as systems of linked signs.31 This
rejection of totalizing ideas as unknowable has led to an emphasis on
probability, relativity of meaning, difference, and the construction of reality by

26. CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, RACE AND HISTORY 30–33, 46–49 (1952).
27. Edmond J. Keller, Decolonization, Independence, and the Failure of Politics, in AFRICA
156, 160–61 (Phyllis M. Martin & Patrick O’Meara eds., 1995).
28. Phyllis M. Martin & Patrick O’Meara, Africa: Problems and Perspectives, in AFRICA 3,
7–9 (Phyllis M. Martin & Patrick O’Meara eds., 1995).
29. See generally Eppinger, supra note 3.
30. Id. at 415–20.
31. Id. at 420–-23.
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means of symbolic communication.32 These methods—now a half century
mature and still evolving—continue to carry considerable potential for fresh
interpretations of the bonds between law and culture.33 They helped to
eliminate outdated and arbitrary approaches like Marxian determinism, or
Levi-Straussian deep and timeless structures. A concept of constructed,
instituted meanings has been instrumental in replacing logocentric discourses
that rigidly rested on the assumption that words are reflections of a stable,
objective reality.34 To mention one example, scholars have spent decades
arguing—otherwise rightly—that exceptionalism as an arc of history unique to
America did not objectively exist.35 Only recently they began to understand
that American exceptionalism consists of widespread consciousness of
exceptionalism, and, accordingly, shifted their interpretative efforts to such
subjectivities.36 Postmodern epistemology is also valuable in its insistence on
our limitations—by raising the awareness that scholars are an inalienable part
of their cultures—and that the way they represent things not only structures the
depicted reality but also reflects their authors as much, if not more, as their
subjects.37
In her argument, Eppinger largely limits herself to the sphere of language,
taking her cues from linguistics and semiotics, especially from John Austin’s
theory of performative speech acts as social actions.38 Because such acts must
operate within conventions (frameworks of what is possible and thinkable) and
require authority to create social reality, she recommends them as useful
prisms through which to interpret the ways in which constitutions—when
treated as categories of communicative action—constitute social reality.39 She
also enlists practice theory and Irving Goffman’s micro-sociological theory of
performance as a communicative exchange between the actor and the observer
to elaborate on the performative strength of speech acts.40 She makes the case
that the ability of speech acts to constitute social inclusion and exclusion,
authority, and cultural reproduction make them effective tools of interpreting
the impact of constitutions on different communities (one of the concerns of

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 418–20.
Id. at 415–20.
See Eppinger, supra note 3, at 415–20.
See generally Peter Onuf, American Exceptionalism and National Identity, in 1
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 77 (2012).
36. Id. at 79–80.
37. Jerry Topolski, A Non-postmodernist Analysis of Historical Narratives, in 41 POZNAN
STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE HUMANITIES 9, 9 (Jerzy Brzeziński et al. eds.,
1994).
38. Eppinger, supra note 3, at 418–20.
39. Id. at 419–20.
40. Id. at 417.
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comparative law).41 Eppinger’s reasoning is articulate, sophisticated, and
elegant. It is also judicious; for instance, with an eye on the usefulness of the
methods for interpreting constitutions, she appropriately identifies and discards
the static character of Goffman’s performance theory, and corrects his error
with more recent understandings of continuous cultural reproduction.42
Nonetheless, cultures have more dimensions than the linguistic and the
performative. With all their seductively fertile explanatory advantages, these
two approaches have certain limitations that deserve our attention. First, the
focus on language and communication should not mean that socio-economic
factors are excluded from the analysis. This, of course, is often easier said than
done because poststructuralist theory tends to be allergic to macro-scale
concepts.43 Second, the same theory strongly stresses the independence of
language from its outside referents, but lived experience also involves realities
that are more than mere perceptions of experience. Even if one accepts that
there is no knowable, independent, absolutely objective reality, not everything
can be thought of in terms of imagined realities—even if so much of culture
rests on them. To use an example once offered by Susan Sontag, cancer—
when it occurs in lived experience—is just a disease, and not a metaphor of
anything.44 Third, the relativism of meanings need not be absolute. The
number of meanings that words can take is not infinite, as some of the scholars
quoted by Eppinger have claimed.45 Auschwitz was Auschwitz—it cannot be
read to mean “cumulus clouds” or “Hawaiian vacation.”
To put it another way, we should be wary of pursuing too much of a
laissez-faire, de-centered, micro-scale analysis, because this kind of inquiry is
eminently capable of not only atomizing knowledge, but also of paralyzing
systemic thought. The very talk of systemic patterns can bring about charges of
naïve realism and of essentializing the concept of culture (two real dangers, but
currently also serving as liturgical terms used to signal a lack of theoretical
sophistication).46 Anthropology and behavioral sciences are not usually
disposed to put much emphasis on the diachronic perspective, but to study and
understand culture’s long-term role, not to mention the ability to explain
causality, we do need systemic reflection that goes beyond the rather confined
and present-oriented focus that characterizes speech act and performance
analysis. Just as importantly, to comparatively investigate constitutional law,

41. Id. at 419–20.
42. Id. at 418–20.
43. See, e.g., JAQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
trans., The Johns Hopkins University Press 1976).
44. SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 3, 3 (Anchor
Books ed., Doubleday 1990) (1978).
45. See, e.g., Derrida, supra note 43.
46. Eppinger, supra note 3, at 420–22.
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broader systemic concepts are required in order to even envision the yardstick
we need to assess the commensurability of different constitutions in their
different cultural contexts. Finally, we need some sort of a systemic concept of
the whole, not fragments, to anticipate any broader conclusions of our
comparative analysis.
Cultures are hard to define and exceedingly difficult to capture; they are
multifarious, subtle, crafty, and deceitful entities. It is too easy to dismiss their
existence and replace them with Derridan fluctuations of vacuum, or with
assemblages of disembodied, individual acts. There are other ways of
disentangling this challenge. For instance, it is quite possible to envision a nonnaïve concept of reality that acknowledges the investigating scholar’s
influence—through the representations employed—on the narrative being
produced. Jerzy Topolski has usefully suggested that we do so by
distinguishing as clearly as possible between three levels of a narrative: the
informative, the persuasive (rhetorical), and the ideological (controlling).47
Similarly, it is also possible to fashion a concept of non-absolute, non-final
truth that accepts the existence of many versions of the reality being
investigated, without rejecting the very notion of truth as nothing more than a
metaphysical millstone.48
In curious but mutually consistent ways, cultures and constitutions share a
similar raison d’être. To operate as engines that organize people’s lives, they
both depend on imagined reality. They both rest on the fiction that their
provisions are timeless, stable, true, even absolute (no de-centering for them).
They both seek to force humans to conform to their presence and demands.
They both cannot exist without proper respect for their authority (imagine the
unwritten British constitution without the deference and authority accorded to
it). In all this, they are both capable of absorbing and containing diverse and
even contradictory ingredients in non-contradictory ways. It is this set of
magical attributes that enables them to constitute order and make sense of
people’s lives.49

47. Topolski, supra note 37, at 9.
48. See id.
49. On the enabling mechanisms of constitutions, see JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM 4–5 (2011). On the structuring power of cultural symbols, see PIERRE BOURDIEU,
LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 166 (John B. Thompson ed., Gino Raymond trans., 1995).
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